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1.0 Introduction 
 
This paper investigates whether disclosure guidelines issued by the New Zealand Financial 
Markets Authority changed the non-GAAP reporting policies of New Zealand companies. Financial 
markets authorities were concerned that company managers might use non-GAAP financial 
measures to mislead users.  The New Zealand Financial Markets Authority responded in 2012  
introducing guidelines that were to be applied from 2013. The guidelines (FMA 2012)  were intended 
to reduce the potential non-GAAP information to be misleading by ensuring that they: (1) are not 
given undue prominence in investor communications, (2) are reconciled to the audited financial 
information, (3) are calculated consistently from period to period and is unbiased (FMA, 2012).   
Prior research in the United States has examined the impact of regulation on the reporting of 
non-GAAP earnings.  Studies have shown that the impact of SEC regulations implemented in 2003 
improved disclosure practices and led to less mispricing of securities (Marques 2006, Entwistel, 
Feltham and Mbagwu 2006).  In this paper we assess the consequences of guidelines in lieu of 
regulation.  We examine whether there was a reduction in the frequency of the reporting of non-
GAAP earnings and whether the quality of disclosures improved.  It is the first study to provide 
evidence on the response by New Zealand listed companies New Zealand Financial Markets 
Authority guidelines.  The study also adds to a very small body literature assessing the impact of 
guidelines rather than regulations on non-GAAP reporting.  We find that there has been little change 
in the disclosure practices of New Zealand listed companies.  We note with concern the frequent 
prominence given to non-GAAP earnings in preference to audited statutory profit.   
The next section we compare some different approaches taken by capital market regulators to 
mitigate the risk that company managers might use non-GAAP earnings measures to mislead market 
participants.  It also summarises empirical evidence on the impact of the use of regulations (in the 
United States) and the use of recommendations (in Europe) on non-GAAP disclosure practices.  
Section Three explains the research questions and Section Four provides a description of the sample 
sample and research design.  The results are presented and discussed in Section Five while Section 
Six provides our conclusions derived from the results.  
 
2. Literature Review  
Background 
There are two competing motives to explain managers’ behaviour to disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings. The first is that managers disclose non-GAAP as a means of communicating information 
about (or signalling) firm performance (Bhattacharya et al. 2003, Brown and Sivakumar 2003, 
Bowen, et al. 2005; Lougee and Marquardt 2004).  An alternative explanation is that manager’s 
report opportunistically, using non-GAAP earnings to convey a more favourable impression of 
reported earnings as a way of influencing users’ perceptions of managerial performance 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2004, Bowen et al. 2005).  An example is managers excluding expenses when 
doing so allows them to meet earnings benchmarks (Black and Christensen, 2009 and Doyle, 
Jennings and Soliman, 2013). However, non-GAAP measures are calculated in different ways by 
companies and are not audited.  
Regulation  
Regulators and professional accounting bodies have raised concerns about the use of 
alternative performance measures reported outside the audited financial statements in press 
releases and other documents (McLaughlin, 2010; FMA, 2011). Regulators acknowledge that while 
NGE may provide useful information to users there is also the potential to mislead them (FMA, 2011, 
2012). In order to maintain market confidence various regulators have introduced regulations, 
recommendations or guidelines for issuers to follow when disclosing non-GAAP earnings.  
In the United States the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 required the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to address NGE disclosures. SEC Regulation G (SEC, 2003) was issued and made 
effective from March 2013.  The regulation requires that where a firm publicly discloses information 
that includes a non-GAAP financial measure that it must provide (1) a directly comparable GAAP 
measure; and (2) reconcile the differences between the non-GAAP measure and the GAAP measure.   
Where such information is filed with the SEC firms must also give reasons why management 
considers the non-GAAP information is useful to investors and additional purposes for which the 
financial measure is used.  
In Europe governing non-GAAP earnings reporting best practice recommendations were 
issued by the Committee of European Securities Regulators1 (CESR) in 2005.  The recommendations 
outline that pro forma earnings measures should be defined and the differences between the 
statutory and pro forma measure be explained.  
Currently the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (2014) is revising the 
guidelines and undertaking a consultation process.  The guidelines are intended to be mandatory. 
ESMA acknowledges that alternative performance measures (APMs) are often used by issuers to 
enable users to better understand the business, its underlying drivers and impact of external 
influences. ESMA identifies problems with disclosures including difficulties in reconciling the 
information.  APM definitions are not always provided or applied consistently. They also suggest that 
APMs are used in a biased manner in reporting on performance.   
The revised guidelines are aimed at making the APMs relevant, consistent and comparable. All 
APMs used are to be defined and applied consistently along with an explanation of their relevance 
for users.  APMs have to be reconciled to the financial statements and comparative figures from 
precious periods provided.  APMs are to be presented with less prominence that GAAP measures. 
There are currently no regulations with respect to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings in 
Australia and New Zealand, but both countries have guidelines. Australian listed companies are 
encouraged to follow guidelines issued by the Australian Institute of Company Directors and the 
Financial Services Institute of Australasia (2009). In addition, the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) (2011) Regulatory Guide 230 requires  that non-GAAP earnings 
                                                          
1 Now reformed as the European Securities and Markets Authority 
should not be included in the statutory financial statements but only in the notes to those financial 
statements when it is necessary to give a true and fair view. Non-GAAP earnings are permitted in 
other communications such as directors’ reports, press releases and analyst briefings but they must 
not be misleading or be given greater prominence than GAAP financial information. A reconciliation 
between non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings would also be required along with explanations of 
the adjustments. Consistent with the ESMA proposed guidelines the measures have to be prepared 
consistently from period to period and comparative figures provided.   
In September 2012, New Zealand’s FMA released a guidance note on disclosure of non-GAAP 
financial information for issuers, their directors and preparers of financial information. The 
guidelines set out expectations on the use of financial information in corporate documents and 
require a reconciliation between NGE and GAAP earnings along with explanations of the 
adjustments. The guidance note covers the definition of what the FMA considers as non-GAAP 
information. It also includes disclosure requirements to reduce the risk that the information may be 
misleading to users.  Ten disclosure requirements are listed in the guidance note and are 
summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 Presentation of non-GAAP information  
 
Criteria   
1. Directors justification  Directors must provide a statement of why the non-GAAP information 
is useful to investors. 
2. Lack of prominence Non-GAAP information must not be disclosed in such a way to give it 
undue prominence, emphasis or authority 
3. Labelled Non-GAAP information has to be labelled to clearly differentiate it 
from GAAP information.  
4. Narrative explanation of 
calculation  
How the non-GAAP financial information is calculated must be 
explained 
5. Reconciliation with GAAP 
financials  
A reconciliation of non-GAAP and GAAP information is to be disclosed. 
Significant adjustments need to be disclosed separately and linked to 
the financial statements or an explanation of how it is calculated.  
6. Consistent approach  A consistent approach to the calculation of non-GAAP information is 
to be applied. Any changes in approach have to be explained along 
with the financial impact of the change.  
7. Non-GAAP adjustments  Comparative information to also be adjusted  
8. Unbiased Non-GAAP adjustments should not over(under)state good(bad) news. 
9. Use of term “one-off”  Non-GAAP adjustments are not be referred to as “one-off” if they 
have occurred in the past and are likely to occur in the future.  
10. Derived from audited or 
reviewed financial  
A clear statement is to be made if non-GAAP financial information is 
obtained from audited or reviewed financial statements 
 
Impact of Regulation G in the United States 
In the United States the introduction of disclosure regulations resulted in an initial reduction 
in the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings (Marques, 2006, Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu, 2006) 
Research studies also find that companies reduce the use of reporting non-GAAP earnings higher 
than GAAP earnings (Entwistle, Feltham, and Mbagwu, 2006)), less likely to reach analyst forecasts 
(Heflin and Hus, 2008) and less emphasis to discussing non-GAAP earnings in press releases 
(Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu, 2006).  
The quality of items excluded from non-GAAP earnings is found to improve after regulation, 
with items excluded being more transitory than core items (Kolev, Marquardt and McVay, 2008). 
Investors reaction to non-GAAP earnings is higher in the post regulation period indicating that they 
have more confidence in the reporting, but they are more sensitive to aggressive (benchmarking 
beating) non-GAAP earnings reporting (Black, Black, Christensen and Heninger, 2012).  
Overall the research indicates that the regulations improved disclosures in ways that are 
unlikely to mislead investors. However, there is still evidence of opportunistic behaviour (Baumaker, 
Biggs, McVay and Pierce, 2014). 
Impact of European Recommendations   
Hitz (2010) examines the impact of the European recommendations on proforma earnings 
disclosures in press releases from 2005-2006 for a sample of listed companies on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, finding that the recommendations had little impact on disclosure practices and that the 
transparency of adjustments to earnings was low. In contrast, Aubert and Grudrutski (2014), using a 
sample of companies listed on the Euro STOXX Fixed Index, find that high quality reconciliations 
reduce the impact of mispricing of securities associated with pro forma disclosures.  
Impact of Australian Guidelines   
Cameron et al. (2012) focus on the reporting of non-GAAP earnings in the annual report prior 
to the ASIC guidelines.  They compared the relative emphasis given to GAAP versus non-GAAP 
earnings among Australian firms over the three year period 2007-2009 prior to the implementation 
of the guidelines. They found that many companies emphasise proforma earnings in preference to 
statutory profit and in sixty per cent of cases proforma earnings was higher. They conclude that 
“impression management” is the most common motivation for managers to emphasise non-GAAP 
earnings.  To date no research is available on the impact of the ASIC guidelines. 
 
3. Research Questions 
The FMA guidelines do not prohibit the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings but establish when 
they should or should not be disclosed and how non-GAAP earnings should be presented to ensure 
the information is not misleading (FMA, 2012).  The introduction of the guidelines and monitoring by 
the FMA may discourage firms from making non-GAAP disclosures. The first research question is:  
Research Question 1 
Does the number of New Zealand listed companies disclosing non-GAAP earnings decline from 2012 
to 2013?  
 
The FMA guidelines are issued to avoid misleading investors.  The potential to mislead may 
results from non-GAAP earnings being used to increase earnings, smooth earnings and to meet 
earnings benchmarks strategic earnings benchmarks (Black and Christensen, 2009, Barth et al., 
2012).  Given the FMA’s intention to monitor disclosures it is expected that there will be a reduction 
in the number of firm using non-GAAP earnings to achieve strategic earnings benchmarks. The 
second research question is. 
Research Question 2 
Does the number of New Zealand listed companies disclosing non-GAAP earnings to meet strategic 
earnings benchmark decline from 2012 to 2013?  
 The FMA guidelines cover disclosure of non-GAAP earnings in annual reports (excluding the 
financial statements), market announcements, and presentations to analysts or investors.  The FMA 
provides guidance on ensuring the disclosures are not misleading as summarised in Table 1.  The 
third research question considers if the guidelines improve the quality of disclosures.  
Research Question 3 
Does application of FMA guidance on presentation of non-GAAP information in annual reports, 
improve from 2012 to 2013? 
 
4. Sample and Research Method  
The FMA guidelines (2012) were effective for non-GAAP financial information disclosures from 
1st January 2013.  The population consists of all firms listed on New Zealand’s stock exchange the 
NZX in 2013, the year of the introduction of the guidelines.  The annual reports of each of the firms 
are examined to identify instances of non-GAAP reporting.   
The sample is all firms that reported non-GAAP earnings in 2013 and 2012 so that the impact 
of the FMA guidelines on NGE disclosures can be examined.  Only the year 2013 is selected to 
analyse any changes in disclosures as a longer time series may be impacted by a number of other 
factors (Heflin and Hsu, 2008).   
Table 1 summarises the 2013 and 2012 samples.  
[Insert Table 1] 
The annual reports are examined for the sample of companies 2012 and 2013.  Non-GAAP 
reconciliation data is hand collected from the reports to record the difference between GAAP and 
non-GAAP earnings and the differences between them.  The frequency of NGE reporting and the 
nature of non-GAAP adjustments are compared.  In addition non-GAAP earnings are compared with 
strategic benchmarks.   
The quality of disclosures in annual reports is measured against the FMA guidelines using a 
quality index.  Disclosure indices are a valid research tool (Botosan, 1997; Hooks and van Staden, 
2011) and are used widely in accounting research. However, they are also considered difficult to 
apply because of issues about what defines disclosure quality and that assessing disclosure quality is 
often context specific (Botosan, 2004).  These issues are mitigated in this research study in the 
following ways. First the disclosure quality is defined in terms of the disclosure benchmarks, 
guidance notes and illustrations for presentation of non-GAAP earnings produced by the FMA.  
Second, although the FMA guidelines are to apply to a range of communications to investors2, we 
limit the context to information provided in annual reports.  Third we limited the analysis to 
definition of non-GAAP earnings to measures which incorporate adjustments made to the statutory 
earnings figure – net profit after tax prepared in accordance with GAAP.  References to other non-
GGAP earnings measures such as EBIT and EBITDA are ignored.  
A scale is used to calculate the quality score.  Appendix 1 illustrates how each of the criteria in 
Table 1 is scored and provides reference to the research literature to support the measure.  In most 
cases the scoring is straightforward when a binary score of 1 or zero is used.  For example, in Table 1, 
Criterion 6 consistency, is coded 1 if a consistent approach is applied to the calculation of non-GAAP 
information or zero if it is not.  In other cases a more complex measure is used, such as the 
measurement of prominence as shown in Appendix 2.  An assessment scale of 1 to 5 is used; a score 
of 1 is given for high prominence of non-GAAP earnings such as the appearance in a headline 
without reference to GAAP earnings.  A score of 5 is given for where the main discussion is of GAAP 
earnings with non-GAAP earnings having secondary importance.   
All scores are moderated by two researchers and differences agreed and then aggregated to 
achieve a score. A high score indicates higher quality of disclosure in terms of the FMA guidance. 
                                                          
2 The FMA (2012) guidelines apply to non-GAAP financial information included in company information 
released in investor communications, other than financial statements and transaction documents. 
5. Results  
Table 1 shows the frequency of non-GAAP reporting. In 2013 24 out of 107 (22%) companies 
reported non-GAAP earnings and 24% (24 out of 102) in 2012.  There are 24 companies reporting 
non-GAAP earnings in each year.  Thus the Financial Market Authority Guidelines have not reduced 
the number of companies reporting non-GAAP earnings.    
Of 24 companies reporting non-GAAP earnings in 2012, three did not report them in 2013.  
The 2013 companies reporting non-GAAP earnings include the 21 companies from 2012, and three 
additional companies including one newly listed company.  Table 2 summarises the sample 
descriptive statistics.  Companies reporting non-GAAP earnings are larger more profitable and have 
lower gearing compared with other listed companies.  These differences are all statistically 
significant.  
[Insert Table 2] 
We examine if the reported non-GAAP earning are used to strategically beat benchmarks. 
Based on Marques (2010) four benchmarks are used: (1)  non- GAAP earnings is greater than GAAP 
earnings (NGEt > NPATt ) (2) non-GAAP earnings reverses a GAAP loss i.e., NPATt < 0 and NGEt > 0 (3) 
non-GAAP earnings is greater than the previous year’s GAAP earnings but current GAAP earnings 
does not, i.e, NPATt < NPATt-1 and NGEt > NPATt-1 and (d) non-GAAP earnings exceeds analysts’ 
forecasts (AF) , but current GAAP earnings does not i.e., NPATt < AF NPATt < AF.  The results in Table 
3 show little evidence of benchmark beating.  In just over half of the companies, did non-GAAP 
earnings exceed audited net profit after tax (NPAT).  There is only one case where non-GAAP 
earnings reverses a loss, four cases where non-GAAP earnings exceeds prior year earnings and NPAT 
does not, and seven cases where non-GAAP earnings exceed analysts’ forecasts and NPAT does not. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 4 reports the disclosure scores for the 2012 and 2013 pro forma reporting companies. 
The scores range from a low of one to eight.  The maximum score that can be achieved is 17.  The 
mean score is 5.71in 2012 and 6.17 in 2012.  The median score is six in both years.  There has been a 
small improvement in disclosure quality but it is not significant (p value=0.11). 
Table 5 gives a break-down of the scores by category.  What is clearly evident is there is little 
change in the disclosure scores by category. 
As highlighted earlier in the paper our proforma earnings focus was on adjustments to the 
audited net profit after tax figure.  All companies label non-GAAP earnings but use a range of names. 
Those used are: adjusted earnings, underlying earnings, normalised earnings, net distributable 
income, non-recurring income, abnormal earnings and net earnings before restructuring and 
impairment charges.  The most common used is underlying earnings followed by and net 
distributable income which is used by property trust companies.  
Twelve out of the 24 companies (50 per cent) justified the disclosure pro forma earnings 
compared with 10 out 24 (42 per cent) in 2012.  The most common justification is that proforma 
earnings are useful to investors and/or other users; five (two) times used in 2013 (2012).  This was 
followed by non-GAAP earnings described as a better measure of operations and core business 
results (four (five) times used in 2013(2012) and assessing dividend distributions and debt covenant 
requirements (used four times in both 2013 and 2012). 
In 2013 22 out of the 24 companies provided a reconciliation of net profit after tax with the 
pro forma earnings.  The reconciliations are prepared consistently with comparatives provided with 
majority of the reconciliations moving from the GAAP to the non-GAAP earnings figures.  However, 
the reconciliations are not accompanied by narrative explanations with only seven companies in 
2013 that provided any form of narrative explanation; two of these were by footnote. 
A concern is that in 2013 significant adjustments for 13 out of the 22 reconciliations were not 
linked to the financial statements. In a number of cases we could not trace the adjustments to the 
financial statements. 
The reconciliations do not give a clear statement that the non-GAAP financial information is 
obtained from audited or reviewed financial statements. This maybe because preparers consider 
that the source of information is obvious. 
Of concern is the prominence given to non-GAAP earning by companies.  In both years the 
prominence score is 3.0 indicating that non-GAAP earning disclosures take precedence over 
disclosures of GAAP earnings (see Appendix 1).  This is contrast to the intention of the guidelines to 
ensure that “undue prominence, emphasis or authority is given to non-GAAP financial information“ 
(FMA, 2012, p.9).  The following are examples of prominence given to non-GAAP earnings.  Example 
1 shows normalised and net profit after tax given equal prominence in a financial brief presented on 
page 2 of the annual report.  
Example 1  
 
 
Example 2 is a summary of results presented on page 4 of the annual report.  In this case 
underlying profit is emphasised but not net profit after tax. 
Example 2  
 
Example 3 shows the first sentence of the chairman’s report highlighting underlying and not audited 
profit  
Example 3 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of guidelines issued by New Zealand’s Financial Market 
Authority in 2012 on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings by listed companies.   
We examine the non-GAAP earning disclosures applying a disclosure index that rates the 
quality of disclosures in accordance with presentation criteria set out in the guidelines.  We focus on 
adjustments to audited net profit after tax for 2012 and 2013, the year before and after the 
guidelines were introduced.  
The results show just under a quarter of New Zealand listed companies disclose adjusted NPAT 
earnings.  The guidelines had little impact on the number of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings.  
There is no standardisation in the labelling of non-GAAP earnings.  Six different names were 
used for non-GAAP earnings - with the most frequently used being underlying earnings.  All labels 
were used consistently in the annual report.  
All but two of the companies provided reconciliations as required by the guidelines. However 
transparency is affected by the lack of explanations of the adjustments, referencing of the 
adjustments to the financial statements, and the source of the financial information.   
Non-GAAP earnings are regularly disclosed prominently in comparison to GAAP earnings 
suggesting that presentation requirements are necessary but need to be complied with.  
In conclusion the implementation of the guidelines has had negligible impact on the frequency 
and quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures.  The results of this paper call for further investigation 
by the Financial Markets Authority of disclosure behaviour and ways to influence improvements.  
 
Table 1  
Population in 2013 and 2012 
 
 2013 % 2012 % 
NZX All Index companies in 2013 110  110  
Less US company using GAAP, overseas company, no 
2013 Annual Report 
-3 
   
Less US company using GAAP, overseas company, no 
2012 Annual Report 
 
 -3  
Less companies listed in 2013   -5  
Sub-total  107 100 102 100 
GAAP companies 83 78 78 76 
Non-GAAP earnings companies  24 22 24 24 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 
All annual reports (N) 107 102 107 102 107 102 107 102 107 102 
Market capitalisation (000) 612,236 493,821 189,553 160,167 1,013,114 852,947 5,758,525 4,437,621 220 660 
Net profit after tax (000) 34,195 28,846 11,528 7,927 71,079 57,522 337,000 311,000 -306,505 -141,651 
Leverage 0.50 0.51 0.42 0.43 0.52 0.68 4 7 0 0 
Non-GAAP earnings Companies 
(N) 
24 24 24 4 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Market capitalisation (000) 1,412,480 1,230,175 1,072,977 867,573 1,300,106 1,316,765 4,088450 4,437,621 62,702 65,315 
Net profit after tax (000) 85,029 73,952 71,906 42,800 68,527 79,306 238,000 311,000 1,894 -1,633 
Leverage 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.16 0.19 1 1 0 0 
Other Listed Companies (N) 83 78 83 78 83 78 83 78 83 78 
Market capitalisation (000) 380,841 267,251 113,991 82,462 781,715 464,075 5,758,525 2,680,000 220 660 
Net profit after tax (000) 19,496 15,314 5,400 5,640 65,105 40,980 337,000 198,767 -306,505 -141,651 
Leverage 0.51 0.52 0.41 0.40 0.58 0.77 4 7 0 1 
t-stat           
Market capitalisation  
0.00 
(0.00)* 
0.00 
(0.00)* 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Net profit after tax  
0.03 
(0.00)* 
0.00 
(0.00)* 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Leverage 
0.05 
(0.13)* 
0.18 
(0.12)* 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Notes: Leverage is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets   *Non-parametric
Table 3  
Comparing Non-GAAP Earnings to Strategic Benchmarks (N=48)  
 
Year NGE Reporting 
NGE Higher than 
NPAT  
NGE Negates a Loss NGE Negates an 
Earnings Decrease 
NGE Negates a Missed 
Analyst Forecast 
 NGE 
Reports 
NGEt > 
NPATt  
NPATt < 0A NGEt > 0B NPATt < 
NPATt-1 C 
NGEt > 
NPATt-1 D 
NPATt < AFt 
E 
NGEt > AFt 
F 
2013 24 12 0 0 7 2 7 1 
2012 24 13 1 1 6 2 10 6 
Total  48 25 1  1 13 4 17  7 
%  52%  100%  31%  41% 
Notes: NGEt is the non-GAAP earnings in current year, NPATt is the NZ GAAP earnings in current year, NPATt-
1, is the NZ GAAP earnings in the prior year, AF is the average analyst forecast for the current year’s profit.   
 
Table 4  
Disclosure Scores   
 
Companies 2013 2012 Difference 
1 6 7 -1 
2 7 7 0 
3 7 6 1 
4 Not NGE 4 N/A 
5 6 6 0 
6 5 6 -1 
7 8 7 1 
8 6 5 1 
9 6 6 0 
10 Not NGE 4 N/A 
11 4 4 0 
12 6 6 0 
13 3 Not NGE N/A 
14 6 6 0 
15 6 5 1 
16 
7 
Listed in 
2013 N/A  
17 5 5 0 
18 7 Not NGE N/A 
19 8 8 0 
20 5 5 0 
21 7 1 6 
22 Not NGE 6 N/A 
23 7 7 0 
24 8 8 0 
25 6 7 -1 
26 5 5 0 
27 7 6 1 
N 24 24 t-stat 
Mean Score 6.17 5.71 p-value 0.11 
Std Dev 1.24 1.52  
Median Score 6.00 6.00  
Sum 148 137  
Max 8 8  
Min 3 1  
Note: Maximum score potential is 17  
Table 5  
Summary of Disclosure Index Scores by Category 
Criteria  Yes No 
 2013 2012 2013 2012 
Directors justification 12 10 12 14 
Labelled 24 24 0 0 
Narrative explanation of calculations  7 5 17 19 
Reconciliation with GAAP financials  22 20 2 4 
Consistent approach  23 23 1 1 
Comparatives of non-GAAP adjustment  22 20 2 4 
Unbiased 14 14 10 10 
Not using the term “one-off”  19 17 5 7 
Derived from audited or reviewed financial 
statements 
5 4 19 20 
 Average   
 2013 2012   
Lack of prominence* 3.04 3.00   
t-stat p-value  0.41   
*Possible scores are from 1 to 5 
 Appendix 1 Disclosure Index  
  Coding Reference  
Directors Justification  Directors must provide a statement of why the 
non-GAAP information is useful to investors. 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes; 0=No 
Sub-coding  
Code statements. The statements can cover more than one of the 
categories below: 
1. better measure of operations or more indicative of core 
business results  
2. 2 useful to investors and/or other users  
3. used by management for internal purposes 
4. improves consistency and/or comparability 
5. used for assign dividend distribution and debt covenant 
requirements 
6. No justification 
7. Other  
Webber et al. (2013) 
Lack of Prominence Non-GAAP information must not be disclosed in 
such a way to give it undue prominence, 
emphasis or authority 
Disclosure score 1 to 5 
1. Appearance in headline: Non-GAAP earnings in a headline of the 
directors’ report and management commentary (press release) 
but NOT GAAP earnings. 
2. Appearance in graphical presentation: Non-GAAP earnings is 
reported in a graphic in directors report and management 
commentary (press release) but NOT GAAP earnings.  
3. Pro Forma dominates: Discussion of non-GAAP earnings clearly 
takes precedence over GAAP earnings. These include: 
3.1 where non-GAAP earnings is mentioned in the first page 
of the directors or management commentary (first 
paragraph of the press release) but NOT GAAP earnings, 
or 
3.2 where commentary on performance given throughout 
the directors report and management commentary 
(press release) relates primarily to non-GAAP earnings 
with few comments on GAAP earnings, or  
3.3 GAAP earnings is presented but not commented in 
directors or management commentary (press release), 
or 
3.4 GAAP profit figure and reconciliation ARE NOT contained 
in the directors or management commentary(press 
Entwistle et al. (2006) 
and FMA(2012)  
release) 
4 GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are equally prominent: Discussion 
of both measures is mentioned at the same rate. For example, 
whenever a pro forma measure is mentioned, the equivalent 
GAAP measure is also mentioned. 
5 GAAP dominates: Discussion of GAAP earnings clearly take 
precedence over non-GAAP earnings. These include 
5.1 where GAAP earnings is mentioned in first page in the 
directors or management commentary (first paragraph 
of the press release) but NOT non-GAAP earnings, or 
5.2 where commentary on performance given throughout 
the directors report and management 
commentary(press release) relates primarily to GAAP 
earnings with few comments on non-GAAP earnings, or  
5.3 Non-GAAP earnings is presented but not commented in 
directors or management commentary. (press release), 
or 
5.4 GAAP profit figure and reconciliation ARE contained in 
the directors or management commentary(press 
release) 
Labelled Non-GAAP information has to be labelled to 
clearly differentiate it from GAAP information.  
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes –non-GAAP labelled consistently; otherwise 0 
Sub-coding  
Classify the terminology given to the non-GAAP earnings figure 
1. Non-GAAP earnings 
2. Core earnings 
3. Adjusted earnings 
4. Underlying earnings 
5. Earnings after adjustments 
6. Normalised 
7. Other Label 
Label used consistently Yes/No 
 
Narrative Explanation 
of Calculation  
How the non-GAAP financial information is 
calculated must be explained 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes if calculation is explained; otherwise 0 explained 
Sub-coding  
Classify how the explanation was given: 
1. Explanation within narrative of directors or management 
commentary(press release) 
2. Explanation within narrative plus support from director internal 
policy Explanation in footnote 
 
3. Explanation by footnote 
Reconciliation with 
GAAP financials  
A reconciliation of non-GAAP and GAAP 
information is to be disclosed.  
 
 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes if reconciliation is given explained; 0= if no reconciliation  
Sub-coding  
1. Side by side 
2. Move from GAAP to non-GAAP showing the adjustments 
3. Move from non-GAAP to GAAP showing the adjustments 
4. Other  
Marques (2010)  
Significant adjustments need to be disclosed 
separately and linked to the financial 
statements or an explanation of how it is 
calculated. 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes if adjustments can be identified in the financial statements or 
calculation shown; otherwise 0  
 
Consistent Approach  A consistent approach to the calculation of non-
GAAP information is to be applied.  
Disclosure Score 
1 =Same adjustments as prior year, otherwise, 0  
 
 
Non-GAAP 
Adjustments  
Comparative information to also be adjusted  Disclosure Score 
1=Yes, 0=No 
 
Unbiased Non-GAAP adjustments should not 
over(under)state good(bad) news. 
Disclosure Score  
1=Neutral: non-gaap earning presented in an unbiased way in 
reference to company performance.    
0=Good news: non-gaap earnings presented in a positive way in 
reference to the company’s performance 
0=Bad news: non-gaap earning presented in a negative in reference 
to the company’s performance  
 
Use of term “one-off”  Non-GAAP adjustments are not to be referred 
to as “one-off” if they have occurred in the past 
and are likely to occur in the future.  
Disclosure Score 
1=Recurring items are not referred to as “one-off” items , 0 
otherwise 
 
Derived from audited 
or reviewed financial  
A clear statement is to be made if non-GAAP 
financial information is obtained from audited 
or reviewed financial statements 
Disclosure Score 
1= a clear statement as to audited or reviewed financial information, 
otherwise, 0  
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